Sunday, June 4, 2017

[Notes] Why Trust is Not a Part of the Definition of Faith

Why Trust is Not a Part of the Definition of Faith

by Benjamin Wong



Original: Sunday, June 4, 2017

Last Updated: Sunday, June 4, 2017


The Bipartite and Tripartite Definition of Faith 

1. In traditional Reformed Theology, faith is defined as consisting of three elements: notitia (understanding), assensus (assent), and fiducia (trust).

This is the tripartite definition of faith.

Gordon H. Clark, in Faith and Saving Faith (1983), has made a correction to this traditional definition and eliminated "trust" as a part of the definition of "faith".

(Clark 1983, 118): "Faith, by definition, is assent to understood propositions. Not all cases of assent, even assent to Biblical propositions, are saving faith; but all saving faith is assent to one or more Biblical propositions."

Generic faith: Faith is assent to understood propositions.

Saving faith: Not all cases of assent, even assent to Biblical propositions, are saving faith; but all saving faith is assent to one or more Biblical propositions.

In Gordon Clark's view, faith is defined as consisting of two elements: notitia (understanding) and assensus (assent).

This is the bipartite definition of faith.

One reason why traditional Reformed theology included "trust" as part of the definition of "faith" is because it regarded the object of faith as a person.

Thus to have faith in a person one must trust that person.

Gordon Clark has also clarified that the object of faith is a proposition and not a person.

The purpose of these notes is to give one reason why I think Clark is correct in eliminating "trust" as a part of the definition of "faith".


The Nature of the Definition

2. In defining "faith", what is it that one is defining?

A basic distinction in definition theory is between a real definition and a nominal definition.

A real definition defines a thing while a nominal definition defines a word.

In this case, the aim of the definition is to define the thing "faith" and not the word 'faith'.

How does one define a thing?

One can define a thing by enumerating an essence of that thing.

Following Alvin Plantinga (1974, v), I understand an essence of an object to be a property that is essential and essentially unique to that object.

In defining "faith" as "assent to understood propositions", Gordon Clark is making two claims:

(a) "Assent to understood propositions" is essential to faith in that a person could not have faith unless he assents to understood propositions.

(b) "Assent to understood propositions" is essentially unique to faith in that nothing other than faith could be assent to understood propositions.

The purpose of a real definition is to individuate or uniquely identified a thing by its properties.

A thing can have more than one essences.

In the case of the tripartite definition, the claim is that the conjunction of the three properties (i.e. understanding, assent, and trust) formed an essence of faith.

In the case of the bipartite definition, the claim is that the conjunction of the two properties (i.e. understanding and assent) formed an essence of faith.


How to Criticize a Real Definition

3. If we define a thing by enumerating an essence of that thing and if an essence of a thing is a property that is essential and essentially unique to that thing, then one can criticize a real definition by showing that a property uses in the definition is either not essential or not essentially unique to that thing.


Is "Trust" Part of the Definition of "Faith"?

4. To determine whether "trust" is part of the definition of "faith", one can inquire whether:

(a) "Trust" is essential to "faith".

(b) "Trust" is essentially unique to "faith".

If "trust" is either not essential to "faith" or not essentially unique to "faith", then "trust" is not a part of the definition of "faith".


5. I submit that in Reformed theology, "trust" is not essential to "faith".

Now if the object of trust is a person and if the object of faith is God, then the object of trust in faith is God.

Reformed theology, following the Bible, recognizes the reality of sin even in a regenerated Christian believer.

A Christian that sins and has not repent and confess his sin does not trust God in regard to that sin.


Unless a Christian losses his salvation when he sins and then regains his salvation when he repents and confesses his sin, then "trust" cannot be a part of the definition of "faith".

The claim that a Christian losses his salvation when he sins and regains it when he repents and confesses his sin is Arminian theology, not Reformed theology.


If one can have "faith" without "trust", then "trust" is not essential to "faith".

If a Christian that sins is still a Christian, then "trust" cannot be essential to "faith".

If "trust" is not essential to "faith", then it is not an essence of "faith" and therefore not a part of the definition of "faith".

Gordon Clark is right in eliminating "trust" as a part of his definition of "faith".


Faith, Trust and Assurance of Salvation

6. If trust is not essential to faith, then what is their relationship?

Properly understood, trust is a deontological consequence of faith: one ought to trust God if one has faith in God.


Making trust an essence of faith has enormous pastoral implications in that it makes many Christians doubt whether they are Christians anymore when they sin.

A synonym for faith is belief.

(Clark 1983, 100): "I believe him; I accept his statement as true."

To believe God is to accept the Bible (i.e. the Word of God) as true.

(Clark 1983, 100): "To believe in is simply a reference to the future beyond the present single statement."


Regarding assurance of salvation, I am assured that I am a Christian if I believe certain Biblical propositions about God.

In a normal Christian life, I ought to trust God if I believe in God.


References:

Clark, Gordon H. 1983. Faith and Saving Faith. Jefferson, Maryland: The Trinity Foundation.

Plantinga, Alvin. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

End.